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ABSTRACT 
 
 
We present a model of shadow banking in which banks originate and trade 
loans,  assemble  them  into  diversified  portfolios,  and  finance  these 
portfolios  externally  with  riskless  debt.  In  this  model:  outside  investor 
wealth drives the demand for riskless debt and indirectly for securitization, 
bank  assets  and  leverage  move  together,  banks  become  interconnected 
through markets, and banks increase their exposure to systematic risk as 
they  reduce  idiosyncratic  risk  through  diversification.    The  shadow 
banking  system  is  stable  and  welfare  improving  under  rational 
expectations, but vulnerable to crises and liquidity dry-ups when investors 
ignore tail risks.  
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Shadow  banking  typically  describes  financial  activities  occurring  outside  the  regulated 
banking sector.  In recent years, the most important such activities took the form of rapidly 
expanding provision of short term safe debt to financial intermediaries through money market 
funds and other sources outside of the regulated banking sector (Coval, Jurek, and Stafford 
(2009a), Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2012), Poszar et al. (2010), Shin (2009)).  Much of that 
debt was collateralized through the process called securitization, which involves origination 
and  acquisition  of  loans  by  financial  intermediaries,  the  assembly  of  these  loans  into 
diversified pools, and the tranching of the pools to manufacture safe pieces.  While regulated 
banks played a key role in securitization and held large amounts of securitized assets, a large 
share of the ultimate financing of securitized assets was provided by the shadow banking 
system.  The collapse of shadow banking in 2007 to 2008 arguably played a critical role in 
undermining the regulated banking sector, and in bringing about the financial crisis.  
In this paper, we present a new model of shadow banking and securitization.  In the 
model, a financial intermediary can originate or acquire both safe and risky loans, and can 
finance these loans from its own resources as well as by issuing debt.  The risky loans are 
subject to both institution-specific idiosyncratic risk and aggregate risk.  Critically, but in 
line  with  actual  experience  (e.g.,  Bernanke  et  al.  (2011)),  outside  investors  are  only 
interested in riskless debt (they are assumed to be infinitely risk-averse).   When outside 
investors’ wealth is limited, demand for riskless debt is low, so intermediaries’ own wealth 
and returns from safe projects are sufficient to guarantee whatever riskless debt they issue.  
At higher levels of investor wealth and demand for riskless debt, however, intermediaries 
cannot  generate  enough  collateral  with  safe  projects,  and  an  intermediary’s  own  risky 
projects cannot serve as useful collateral for riskless debt because they are vulnerable to  
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idiosyncratic  risk.    To  meet  the  demand  for  riskless  debt,  intermediaries  diversify  their 
portfolios  by  buying  and  selling  risky  loans  to  eliminate  idiosyncratic  risk,  similarly  to 
Diamond (1984).  Their assets in the form of loan portfolios, and their liabilities in the form 
of riskless debt issued to finance these portfolios, grow together.  Intermediaries essentially 
pursue a carry trade, whereby they pledge the returns on their loan portfolio in the worst 
aggregate state of the world as collateral for riskless debt and earn the upside in better states 
of the world. 
As intermediaries expand their balance sheets by buying risky projects, they increase 
the  systematic  risk  of  their  portfolios,  raise  their  leverage,  and  endogenously  become 
interconnected  by  sharing  each  other’s  risks.    This  is  our  critical  new  result:  the  very 
diversification that eliminates intermediary-specific risks by pooling loans so as to support 
the issuance of debt perceived to be riskless actually raises intermediaries’ exposure to tail 
aggregate risks.  Still, under rational expectations, riskless debt is always repaid, and the 
system is very stable.  The expansion of activity financed by the shadow banking system is 
Pareto-improving,  as  in  standard  models  of  risk  sharing  (Ross  (1976),  Allen  and  Gale 
(1994)).  
Things  change  dramatically  when  investors  and  intermediaries  neglect  tail  risks, 
perhaps because they do not think about truly bad outcomes during quiet times.   Gennaioli, 
Shleifer,  and  Vishny  (GSV  2012)  argue  that  the  neglect  of  tail  risk  is  critical  to 
understanding aspects of the crisis.  There is growing evidence that prior to the crisis even 
sophisticated investors did not appreciate the possibility of sharp declines in housing prices 
(Gerardi  et  al.  (2008)),  and  did  not  have  accurate  models  for  pricing  securitized  debt, 
particularly Collateralized Debt Obligations (Jarrow et al. (2007), Coval, Jurek, and Stafford  
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(2009a)).    GSV  show  that,  with  neglected  risk,  new  financial  products  provide  false 
substitutes for truly safe bonds, and as a consequence can reduce welfare.   
In this paper, we further develop this argument by focusing more explicitly on how 
the shadow banking system offers insurance to investors.  We model not only aggregate but 
also idiosyncratic risk.   By enabling the diversification of idiosyncratic risk, securitization 
promotes the expansion of bank balance sheets and increases financial links among banks.  
Through these channels, the insurance against idiosyncratic risk interacts with the neglect of 
tail  aggregate  risks  in  creating  extreme  financial  fragility.  Brown  (2010)  refers  to  this 
phenomenon as “the diversification myth.”  
In the range of parameter values corresponding to extensive securitization, investors 
neglecting downside risks believe that the payoffs on the collateral in the worst case scenario 
are higher than they actually are, and buy more debt thinking that it is riskless.   The balance 
sheets  of  intermediaries  expand  further  than  they  would  under  rational  expectations.  
However, as intermediaries pool loans to support debt issuance, they increase their exposure 
to systematic risk.  When they and investors realize that a worse state of the world than they 
had  previously  contemplated  might  occur,  intermediaries  face  massive  exposure  to  that 
downside risk, which they bear because they sold “riskless” bonds to investors.   At this 
point, systematic risk becomes systemic in the sense that exposure to macroeconomic risk 
causes  all  intermediaries  to  fail  together.    While  harmless  when  market  participants 
recognize all risks, the diversification myth becomes deadly when they do not.   
Section I presents our model of shadow banking.  Section II solves the model under 
rational  expectations,  and  shows  how  shadow  banking  improves  intertemporal  trade, 
insurance  opportunities,  and  welfare.    In  Section  III,  we  solve  the  model  under  the  
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assumption  of  neglected  risks,  and  show  how  false  insurance  provided  by  financial 
intermediaries when risks are ignored can misallocate risks.  The very benefits of shadow 
banking obtained through diversification and leverage become the source of its demise.  In 
Section IV, we add the opportunities for interim trading to the model, and examine the 
evolution of liquidity under neglected risks.   We also briefly examine the role of short term 
debt.  In Section V we compare our model to the two leading theories of securitization, 
adverse selection and regulatory arbitrage.  Section VI concludes. All proofs are collected in 
an Internet Appendix.
1 
 
I. The Model 
We build on the production model of GSV (2012), with three dates t = 0, 1, 2 and a 
measure one of investors who at t = 0 receive a perishable endowment w and enjoy utility 
  U = Eω[C0 + 
1
min
   C1,ω + 
2
min
   C2,ω],                                          (1) 
where Ct,ω is consumption at t = 1, 2 in state of nature ω t   .  Investors are infinitely risk-
averse in the sense that they value future consumption levels at their worst-case scenario.
2  
Investors  save  by  buying   financial  claims  fro m  a  measure  one  of  risk -neutral 
intermediaries, who are indifferent between consuming at t = 0, 1, 2.  Intermediaries receive an 
endowment wint < 1 at t = 0, and use it – along with the funds raised from investors – to 
finance two activities H and L.  Activity H is riskless: by investing at t = 0 an amount IH,j in 
H, at t = 2 intermediary j obtains the sure amount R∙IH,j.  Activity L is risky: by investing at t 
= 0 an amount IL,j in L, at t = 2 intermediary j obtains the amount  
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in state ω 2   .  The return on the risky activity is i.i.d. across intermediaries, and πω captures 
the share of investments that “succeed” in ω.  There are three final states  2  ≡{g, d, r} such 
that πg > πd > πr.  Here g captures a “growth” state in which most investments succeed, d a 
less productive “downturn,” and r an even less productive “recession.”  At t = 0 it is known 
that state ω 2    occurs with probability φω > 0, where ∑ωφω = 1. Unlike in GSV (2012), 
here intermediaries are subject to idiosyncratic, and not only aggregate, risk. 
   The  expected  return  of  H  is  not  smaller  than  that  of  L,  R  ≥  Eω(πω)∙A,  so  that 
intermediaries (weakly) prefer to invest in the safe activity to investing in the risky one.  
Riskless projects, however, are in limited unit supply, ∫jIH,jdj ≤ 1, and there are no “storage” 
opportunities.  To expand investment beyond this limit, intermediaries must undertake lower-
return risky projects.  We can view investment projects in this model as mortgages, with 
riskier mortgages also offering  lower expected returns.
3   Figure 1  shows the decreasing 
marginal return on investment in the economy.  Low return projects are riskier, both in the 
aggregate  and  at  the  level  of  the  intermediary  (the  dashed  lines  capture  the  possible 
realizations of returns at the level of an intermediary). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
In a given aggregate state of the world, each intermediary faces an idiosyncratic risk 
on its projects (mortgages), perhaps because it is costly to fully diversify its investments.  The 
intermediary can diversify its idiosyncratic (but not aggregate) risk by buying the projects  
 
7 
issued by other intermediaries.  We thus assume that an intermediary cannot diversify all 
idiosyncratic  risk  through  its  own  projects;  it  must  buy  those  of  others.    The  available 
evidence on asset-backed commercial paper conduits indeed shows that such vehicles held a 
variety of securities of different kinds from different countries (Acharya and Schnabl (2010)).  
Since the intermediary is risk-neutral, however, it does not value diversification per se.    
Intermediaries raise funds in two ways. First, they issue riskless debt claims promising 
a  sure  return  r  ≥  1  at  t  =  2.  Riskless  debt  is  a  senior  security  that  pledges  the  lowest 
realization of the payoff on an intermediary’s total assets.  Because this debt is senior, it is the 
last security to absorb losses, if any.  Our focus on riskless debt captures investor demand for 
AAA-rated securities driven by regulation, taste for characteristics, and risk aversion. 
The  second  way  for  intermediaries  to  raise  funds  is  to  “securitize”  their  projects 
(mortgages), which here refers to selling them at t = 0 in exchange for cash. The price received 
by an intermediary for selling one unit of investment at t = 0 is equal to pH for a riskless project 
H and to pL for a risky project L.  Intermediaries can also trade projects among themselves, 
which as we show below boosts their debt capacity.  In our model debt and securitization are 
complements, as the bank puts together a diversified portfolio of projects, tranches it, and 
pledges the safe portion of returns to raise riskless debt.  Diversification allows the creation 
of AAA-rated collateral to raise AAA-rated debt.  For now we only consider safe cash flows 
as collateral; we allow intermediaries to back debt with risky collateral in Section IV.B. 
The timing of the model works as follows.  At t = 0, the return on risky projects is not 
known and each intermediary j: i) raises Dj units of riskless debt promising to repay rDj at t = 
2 (the intermediary lends if Dj < 0), and ii) sells SH,j and SL,j units of riskless and risky 
projects, respectively.  Using its own wealth wint and the resources raised, the intermediary: i)  
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invests IH,j and IL,j units in the riskless and risky projects of its own, respectively, and ii) buys 
TH,j and TL,j units, respectively, of riskless and risky projects financed by other intermediaries.  
Each investor i chooses how much riskless debt Di to issue (the investor lends if Di < 0) and 
how  many  securitized  projects  TH,i  and  TL,i  to  buy.    (In  equilibrium,  investors  will  buy 
riskless debt and not trade in projects, but at the moment we keep the framework general.)  
Markets for debt and for securitized projects clear at competitive prices r, pH, and pL. 
At t = 1, intermediaries can raise new funds, securitized projects can be re-traded, and 
investors can re-optimize their consumption decisions.  At  t = 2, output from projects is 
produced and distributed to intermediaries and investors.  The world ends. 
Crucially, at t = 1 everyone learns the return on intermediaries’ risky projects and the 
aggregate state ω.  Formally, in equation (1) we have    r d g , , 2 1     .  As a consequence, 
at t = 1 all market participants share the same preferences and the same reservation prices 
over assets.  Thus, markets at t = 1 play no role.  We can view this model as consisting only 
of two dates, t = 0 and t = 2.  In the extension of Section IV, the t = 1 market plays a key role.  
We simplify the equilibrium analysis by making the following assumption. 
ASSUMPTION 1:  πd∙A < 1, 
which implies that under both rational expectations and local thinking, intermediaries can 
only borrow a limited amount of funds.  Our main results do not rely on this assumption.  We 
examine  the  joint  determination  of  leverage  and  securitization,  as  well  as  the  forms  of 
securitization, by first assuming rational expectations and then turning to neglected risks.  
 
II. Equilibrium Under Rational Expectations 
If an intermediary j adopts a borrowing, investment, and securitization policy (Dj, IH,j,  
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IL,j, SH,j, SL,j, TH,j, TL,j) at t = 0, its expected profit is the following sum of three components:   
[R∙(IH,j + TH,j – SH,j) + pH(SH,j – TH,j)] + 
+ [Eω(πω)∙A∙(IL,j – SL,j) + Eω(πω)∙A∙TL,j + pL(SL,j – TL,j)] +                               (3) 
– Dj – IH,j – IL,j  + wint – rDj.   
The term in the first squared brackets is the return earned at t = 2 on the IH,j riskless projects 
that the intermediary has financed or purchased in the market (for net amount TH,j – SH,j), plus 
the revenue earned at t = 0 from the net sales of safe projects at unit price pH. 
The term in the second squared brackets captures the same payoff for risky projects, 
with  the  key  difference  being  that  the  expected  return  Eω(πω)∙A∙(IL,j  –  SL,j)  on  an 
intermediary’s  own  investments  must  now  be  kept  distinct  from  the  return  it  earns  on 
securitized risky projects bought in the market, Eω(πω)∙A∙TL,j.  From the standpoint of the 
risk-neutral intermediary, (IL,j – SL,j) and TL,j are equally appealing investments, as they yield 
the same average return.  The risk profiles of these investments are very different, however.  
The intermediary’s own investment (IL,j – SL,j) is subject to both aggregate and idiosyncratic 
risk: in state ω it yields A with probability πω and zero otherwise.  In contrast, the securitized 
projects are subject only to aggregate risk, for risky projects are ex-ante identical and the 
intermediary  buys  a  diversified  portfolio  of  such  projects.  The  securitized  holdings  TL,j 
include part of each intermediary’s investment project, yielding a sure return of πω∙A in state 
ω.  
In this model, securitization and trading allow project “pooling,” as well as insurance 
contracts (in which case the “pooler” is the insurance company).  Pooling is irrelevant for 
riskless projects, which yield R both with pooling and in isolation.  In contrast, pooling of 
risky projects can allow intermediaries to reduce idiosyncratic risk in their balance sheets and  
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risk-averse investors to achieve better diversification in their portfolios.  Our model allows us 
to investigate when pooling occurs and how intermediaries and investors exploit it.    
The third and final piece of equation (3) is the intermediary’s profit at t = 0 net of 
securities trading (i.e., available funds minus investment costs), minus the payment of debt at 
t = 2.  To ease notation, objective (3) excludes borrowing and trading in projects at t = 1.  As 
we argued previously, these markets are irrelevant when ω is learned perfectly at t = 1. 
The intermediary takes prices (r, pH, pL) as given and maximizes its expected profit in 
equation (3) subject to the following constraints.  First, at t = 0 investment and net asset 
purchases must be financed by the intermediary’s own and borrowed funds: 
IH,j + IL,j  + pH(TH,j – SH,j) + pL(TL,j – SL,j) ≤ wint +Dj.                           (4)  
Second, debt issuance at t = 0 must be such that the intermediary is able to repay riskless debt 
in the worst possible state of its balance sheet.  This implies that 
            rDj ≤ R∙(IH,j + TH,j – SH,j) + πr∙A∙TL,j.                                           (5) 
The intermediary can pledge to the creditors: i) its return R∙(IH,j + TH,j – SH,j) from riskless 
projects, and ii) its  holdings  of securitized risky projects evaluated in the worst  possible 
aggregate payoff πr, namely, πr∙A∙TL,j.  The intermediary cannot pledge nonsecuritized risky 
projects (IL,j – SL,j) as collateral for debt payments.  Vulnerable to the idiosyncratic risk of 
yielding zero, these projects cannot support riskless debt. 
  The final constraints concern the feasibility of securitization, 
     SH,j ≤ IH,j,   SL,j ≤ IL,j,                                                         (6) 
which simply say that intermediaries cannot securitize more than they invest.  Note that in (6) 
intermediaries  do  not  re-securitize  portions  of  the  acquired  pool  TL,j.    Since  the  pool  is 
already diversified, there is no benefit from doing so.     
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At  prices  (r, pH, pL)  intermediaries  maximize  (3)  subject  to  (4),  (5),  and  (6).    A 
representative investor i maximizes utility in (1) subject to the constraint that consumption at 
different times and states is equal to C0,i = w + Di – pHTH,i – pLTL,i, C1,ω,i = 0,  and C2,ω,i = – 
rDi + RTH,i + πω∙A∙TL,i, where Di is investors’ borrowing at t = 0, while TH,i and TL,i are the 
investor’s t = 0 purchases of riskless and risky projects, respectively. 
We now describe the equilibrium, starting with the allocation prevailing at t = 0 and 
then  moving  to  see  what  happens  as  agents  learn  ω  at  t  =  1.    We  focus  on  symmetric 
equilibria where all agents of a given type (intermediary or investor) make the same choices. 
Consistent with prior notation, index j captures the actions of the representative intermediary 
and index i captures those of the representative investor.  Detailed proofs are in the Internet 
Appendix. 
 
A. Securitization and Leverage at t = 0     
In equilibrium, investors lend to intermediaries (not the other way around) and the 
return on riskless bonds must satisfy r ≥ 1.  Since investors and intermediaries have the same 
time preferences, lending can only occur for investment projects, which only intermediaries 
have.  Since investors are indifferent between consuming at t = 0, 1, 2, the condition r ≥ 1 
guarantees that lending to intermediaries makes investors weakly better off than autarky.  The 
purchase of a riskless bond and of a securitized riskless project must yield the same return:  
  R/pH = r.                                                              (7) 
If (7) is violated, investors’ preferences as to whether to buy safe debt or a safe loan are the 
opposite of intermediaries’ preferences as to what to issue, so in equilibrium (7) must hold.  
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 Crucially,  investors’  reservation  price  pL,inv  for  securitized  risky  assets  (i.e.,  the 
highest price at which they are willing to buy them) is equal to 
pL,inv  = πr∙A.                                                           (8) 
Infinitely risk-averse investors value a pool of risky projects at its lowest possible payoff, 
obtained in a recession.  This is of course below these projects’ average return Eω(πω)∙A.  
These points imply that in any equilibrium the following property holds: 
 
LEMMA 1: For any given investment profile (IH,j, IL,j), intermediaries are indifferent between 
securitizing and not securitizing riskless projects.  When the riskless debt constraint (5) is 
slack,  intermediaries  are  also  indifferent  between  securitizing  and  not  securitizing  risky 
projects.  When that constraint is binding, intermediaries strictly prefer to securitize at least 
some risky projects.  In such equilibria, we have that SL,j > 0 and risky projects are bought by 
intermediaries, not by investors, so SL,j = TL,j.   
In our model, issuing riskless debt against the return on a riskless project is equivalent 
to selling that project to investors.  Thus, securitization of riskless projects is irrelevant and 
riskless debt perfectly substitutes for it.  We therefore focus on equilibria where SH,j = 0. 
Securitization of risky projects is initially irrelevant, but only until the point when the 
debt constraint (5) becomes binding.  As intermediaries need to absorb more investor wealth 
to finance risky projects, they start selling them off and buying risky projects from other 
intermediaries.    By  diversifying  idiosyncratic  risk,  such  securitization  creates  acceptable 
collateral, relaxing the debt constraint (5).  Indeed, the point of securitization in this model is 
to relax the collateral constraint.  While risk-averse investors are unwilling to lend anything  
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against an individual risky project (as the latter’s return may be zero), they are willing to lend 
something against a pool of risky projects since such a pool eliminates idiosyncratic risk. 
As a consequence, to obtain financing intermediaries (not investors) end up holding 
securitized  pools  of  risky  projects.  This  arrangement  boosts  leverage  because  now 
intermediaries  can  issue  debt  against  the  diversified  pool  of  projects.    As  evident  from 
equation (5), by buying an extra unit of the pool, intermediaries can increase debt repayment 
at most up to investors’ reservation price pL,inv  = πr∙A for that unit.   
Besides boosting leverage, this arrangement enhances risk sharing. In fact, another 
way to expand financing would be for investors to buy a pool of risky projects on their own. 
However, as Lemma 1 shows, this is not the market solution, since risk-neutral intermediaries 
are the efficient bearers of the pool’s aggregate risk and thus are willing to pay more than 
investors for the pool.  Intermediaries are eager to hold a pool because, at a given interest rate 
r, they keep the excess return [Eω(πω)A – r] on the pool.  When Eω(πω)A > r intermediaries 
essentially invest in a carry trade: they borrow at the low safe interest rate from investors, but 
then take on risk to gain the upside of risky projects. With infinitely risk-averse investors and 
risk-neutral intermediaries, there are large gains from such trade.  
In  sum,  securitization  enables  intermediaries  to  boost  leverage  by  pooling  risky 
projects  to  eliminate  idiosyncratic  risk.    By  pledging  the  senior  tranche  of  the  pool  to 
investors, they raise leverage.  Combined with liquidity guarantees from safe projects, the 
senior  tranche  of  the  diversified  pool  of  projects  is  safe,  and  thus  serves  as  acceptable 
collateral for riskless debt. The question then arises: when does securitization take place and 
what does this imply for leverage, interest rates, and investments?  In particular, we would  
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like to know whether greater leverage is associated with larger assets of the intermediaries, 
and greater aggregate risk.  We have the following characterization result: 
 
PROPOSITION 1: If Eω(πω)∙A > 1, there are two thresholds w
* and w
** (w
**> w
*) such that, 
in equilibrium, intermediaries issue Dj = min(w, w
**) and the t = 0 allocation fulfills: 
  (a) If w ≤ 1 – wint, investor wealth is so low that only the safe project is financed and 
securitization does not occur.  Formally, IH,j = wint + w,  IL,j = 0, and SL,j = TL,j = 0.  The 
equilibrium interest rate is r = R.  
(b)  If  w(1–wint,  R/Eω(πω)∙A],  investor  wealth  is  sufficiently  high  that  some  risky 
projects are also financed, but the return on safe investments is enough to repay all debt.  As 
a consequence, securitization does not yet occur.  Formally, IH,j = 1,  IL,j = wint + w – 1, and 
SL,j = TL,j = 0.  The equilibrium interest rate is r = Eω(πω)∙A. 
   (c) If w(R/Eω(πω)∙A, w
*], investor wealth starts to be high enough that not only are 
some  risky  projects  funded,  but  the  safe  return  is  insufficient  to  repay  debt.    Partial 
securitization emerges in the amount that allows intermediaries to just absorb all investor 
wealth.  Formally, IH,j = 1,  IL,j = wint + w – 1, and SL,j = TL,j (0, IL,j).  The equilibrium 
interest rate is still r = Eω(πω)∙A. 
(d) If w > w
*, then investor wealth is so high that many risky projects are funded and 
securitization is maximal.  Formally, IH,j = 1,  IL,j = wint + min(w, w
**) – 1, and SL,j = TL,j = 
IL,j. To allow intermediaries to absorb all of investor wealth, the interest rate must fall below 
the (average) return Eω(πω)∙A and is a decreasing function r(w) of investors’ wealth.   
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The details of the equilibrium, including the prices pH and pL, are described in the 
proof (which also studies the case in which Eω(πω)∙A ≤ 1).  In Figure 2, the thick dotted line 
depicts the average return on investment and the bold line shows the equilibrium interest rate. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The interest rate, securitization, and leverage are driven by the interaction between the 
supply of funds, as captured by investors’ wealth w, and the demand for funds, as captured by 
the return on investment and by intermediaries’ ability to issue riskless debt in equation (5). 
When intermediaries are able to pay interest on the debt equal to the marginal return 
on investment, the equilibrium interest rate is given by that return.  Indeed, if r fell below the 
marginal return on investment, intermediaries would wish to issue more debt than investors’ 
wealth,  which  cannot  happen  in  equilibrium.    This  is  what  happens  in  case  (a),  where 
investors’ wealth is so low that only riskless projects are financed, IH,j = w + wint, in which 
case it is obvious that r = R.  But this is also true in case (b), where investors’ wealth allows 
some risky projects to be undertaken (i.e., IH,j = 1, IL,j = w + wint – 1).  Since investors’ wealth 
is so low that R ≥ Eω(πω)∙A∙w, intermediaries can pay the full marginal return to investors out 
of safe cash  flows.  Thus, in cases  (a) and  (b) investors’ wealth is  sufficiently low that 
riskless debt can be issued without securitization.          
Matters are different when w > R/Eω(πω)∙A.  Now investors’ wealth is so large that the 
return from the limited supply of safe projects alone is insufficient to pay off debt at the 
marginal rate of return on investment.  As (5) illustrates, to expand borrowing intermediaries 
must now engage in at least some securitization.  In case (c), investors’ wealth is not too  
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large, and intermediaries  can absorb this  wealth by securitizing only  partially.  Here the 
interest rate can rise to the marginal product of investment to ensure that intermediaries have 
no appetite for further expanding securitization and borrowing beyond w.  As a result, given 
that now r = Eω(πω)∙A and Dj = w,  equation (5) implicitly pins down securitization through 
the constraint  
Eω(πω)∙A∙w  =  R + πr∙A∙SL,j,                                                (9) 
where  we have replaced the equilibrium condition  SL,j =TL,j. Equation (9) holds until  all 
projects are securitized, that is, until SL,j ≤ IL,j = wint + w – 1.  This is the case provided 
w  ≤  w
* ≡ 
r
r w A R
 

  
 
) ( E
) 1 ( / int ,                                            (10) 
which highlights the role of intermediaries’ own wealth and of the safe project as buffers 
against  project  risk,  supporting  the  intermediary’s  ability  to  borrow.    High  intermediary 
wealth wint reduces the outside financing needs of risky projects, while the safe return  R 
creates a cushion for repaying riskless debt and financing risky projects when r < R.       
As investors’ wealth grows beyond w
*, we are in case (d).  Now financing constraints 
become very tight and intermediaries fully securitize the risky projects financed, setting SL,j = 
IL,j.  In this case, the interest rate must fall below the marginal product of investment for the 
riskless debt constraint to be satisfied, that is, r < Eω(πω)∙A.  This is the range in which 
securitization effectively allows intermediaries to obtain – on each specific unit of the pool 
acquired – an excess return [Eω(πω)∙A – r] from  the carry trade of financing risky projects 
with safe debt.  At the equilibrium quantities of investment and securitization, IL,j = SL,j = wint 
+ w – 1, equation (5) determines the equilibrium interest rate as  
 
17 
r(w) = 
w
w w A R r ) 1 ( int   
,                                               (11)   
which falls in investors’ wealth w.  As w increases, there is a spiral of increasing leverage, 
investment,  and  securitization, and decreasing interest  rates. This  process  continues  as  w 
continues to rise up to the level w
**, at which r(w
**) = one.  At this point r is at its lower 
bound of one.  Further increases in investors’ wealth beyond  w
** cannot be absorbed by 
intermediaries. The spiral of leverage, investment, and securitization, and of falling interest 
rates has now stopped. 
In sum, in our model securitization appears only when marginal risky projects are 
financed.  It is not needed when only safe projects are financed.  As investor wealth becomes 
so large that many risky projects must be financed, securitization combined with the pledging 
of AAA-rated securities and liquidity guarantees is used to accommodate growing leverage.   
 
B.  The Outcome at t = 1, 2 after ω is Learned  
Given the investment and securitization patterns (IH,j, IL,j, SL,j) at t = 0, consider what 
happens after ω is learned.  We focus on the most interesting case where the debt constraint 
(5) is binding and securitization is positive.  Since investors have lent under a riskless debt 
contract, at t = 2 they (in aggregate) receive – for any given ω – the promised amount 
rDj = R∙IH,j  + πr∙A∙SL,j.                                                    (12) 
  Intermediaries, on the other hand, efficiently bear the aggregate risk associated with 
ω, but they also bear the idiosyncratic risk created by their own risky project to the extent that 
they only partially securitized it.  For any ω, at t = 1 there are two classes of intermediaries.  
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The first class consists of “successful” intermediaries, whose risky project pays out.  In state 
ω there are by definition πω such intermediaries, and their t = 2 revenues are equal to  
RIH,j + πω∙A∙SL,j + A∙(IL,j – SL,j).                                            (13)        
By subtracting (12) from (13), we find that, for these successful intermediaries, profits at t = 
2 are equal to (πω – πr)∙A∙SL,j + A∙(IL,j –  SL,j).   These profits accrue from the securitized pool 
if πω > πr and from the nonsecuritized investments that pay out.     
The second class consists of “unsuccessful” (and not fully diversified) intermediaries 
whose risky project has not paid out.  The revenues of these 1– πω intermediaries are equal to  
RIH,j + πω∙A∙SL,j + 0∙(IL,j – SL,j).                                         (14) 
By subtracting (12) from (14), we find that, for these “unsuccessful” intermediaries, profits at 
t = 2 are equal to (πω – πr)∙A∙SL,j.  All these profits accrue from holding the upside of the 
securitized  pool  of  assets.  When  securitization  is  full  (SL,j  =  IL,j),  there  is  no  distinction 
between successful and unsuccessful intermediaries.  All intermediaries earn the same profits 
(πω – πr)∙A∙IL,j in (13) and (14).  This observation will turn out to be critical to understanding 
the link between securitization and fragility.  
From this analysis, we can draw the following lessons.  When all market participants 
hold  rational  expectations,  securitization  facilitates  a  better  allocation  of  risks,  boosts 
leverage and thus productive investment, and improves welfare.  It allows the extremely risk-
averse  investors  to  shed  all  of  their  risks,  while  risk-neutral  market  participants 
(intermediaries) are happy to bear all the residual risk to earn the extra return.  As long as all 
investors understand the risks, the system is stable and there is no link between securitization 
and fragility. Full securitization eliminates idiosyncratic risk and creates stability.  Even when 
securitization is only partial, investors anticipate that some idiosyncratic risk will turn out  
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badly, which reduces the ability of any individual intermediary to borrow, so that even ex-
post unsuccessful intermediaries are able to repay their debt. 
This analysis of shadow banking explains several empirical phenomena.  It accounts 
for  the  role  of  extremely  risk-averse  investors  in  driving  the  demand  for  securitization 
(Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2008)).  It 
explains how leverage and assets of intermediaries grow together (Adrian and Shin (2010)).   
It further explains how, in equilibrium, intermediaries pursuing a carry trade take marginal 
risky projects when interest rates are low (Greenwood and Hanson (2011), Maddaloni and 
Peydro  (2011)),  and  how,  through  securitization,  intermediaries  become  endogenously 
interconnected (Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012)).  Finally, it explains how diversification of 
idiosyncratic  risk  through  securitization  concentrates  systematic  risks  on  the  books  of 
financial intermediaries (Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2012)).  Under rational expectations, 
however, all these developments are benign. 
At the same time, the shadow banking system is vulnerable to unanticipated shocks.   
Its  enormous  size  when  outside  investor  wealth  is  high,  the  extreme  distaste  of  those 
investors for bearing any risk that consequently piles up these risks with intermediaries, and 
the  role  of  securitization  in  increasing  leverage  all  render  shadow  banking  vulnerable to 
shocks.  When we add such shocks to the model in the form of neglected low probability tail 
risks,  the  system  becomes  fragile.  Shadow  banking  provides  illusory  rather  than  true 
insurance to investors, and as such it massively misallocates risk. 
 
III. Local Thinking  
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We model local thinking by assuming, following Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) and 
GSV (2012), that at t = 0 both investors and intermediaries only think about the two most 
likely states.  Recall that recession is the least likely state (i.e., φg > φd > φr).  This prior 
distribution reflects a period of economic prosperity.  At t = 0 expectations are thus formed 
based on the restricted state space 
LT  ≡{g, d}, covering only the possibilities of growth and 
downturn.  Superscript LT denotes the information set and beliefs of a local thinker.   
There is a superficial tension between our assumptions of infinite risk aversion of 
investors  and  their  neglect  of  tail  downside  risk.  Shouldn’t  infinite  risk  aversion  imply 
extreme  alertness  to  precisely  such  risks?  The  answer,  in  our  view,  is  no.  First,  one 
assumption concerns preferences and the other concerns beliefs, which are logically separate.  
Experimental evidence suggests that individuals overweigh small probability events when 
they are salient, but ignore them when they do not come to mind (Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979), Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012)).  Evidence on the forecasts of housing prices 
(Gerardi et al. (2008)) and on models used by rating agencies (Jarrow et al. (2007), Coval, 
Jurek, and Stafford (2009a)) shows that the events that ultimately occurred were too extreme 
to  even  be  contemplated  in  advance.  Second,  investors’  misperception  may  have  been 
reinforced by AAA ratings, issued by rating agencies using quantitative models and historical 
data.  The ratings intended to reassure infinitely risk-averse investors that these securities met 
their tastes.       
Unlike in GSV (2012), market participants are fully aware that intermediaries are 
subject to the idiosyncratic risk of obtaining a zero payoff.  The subtler failure of rationality 
here  is  that  market  participants  neglect  the  aggregate  risk  that  only  as  few  as  πr 
intermediaries may be successful.  Given the technology of equation (2), this neglect creates  
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two  problems.    First,  it  induces  overoptimism  about  the  average  return  of  an  individual 
intermediary, 
LT E (πω)∙A > Eω(πω)∙A.  Second, it induces market participants to neglect the 
fact that an intermediary may be unsuccessful precisely in a state – a recession with aggregate 
payoff πr∙A – in which many other intermediaries are also unsuccessful.  This second effect 
plays some role in Section III.B, but will be especially important in Section IV. 
 
A.  Securitization and Leverage at t = 0 under Local Thinking 
Since  expectations  are  the  only  object  that  changes  relative  to  the  case  with  full 
rationality, the equilibrium at t = 0 is isomorphic to the rational expectations equilibrium of 
Proposition  1,  except  that:  i)  the  true  expected  return  Eω(πω)∙A  is  replaced  by  the  local 
thinker’s expected return 
LT E (πω)∙A =  A d g   ) , ( E    and ii) the worst-case contemplated 
scenario is now a downturn rather than a recession.  Thus, when valuing different securities 
the local thinker fails to account for their exposure to the recession.  This neglect of risk 
implies that the thresholds w
* and w
** of Proposition 1 are replaced by w
*,LT  and w
**,LT and 
one can check that w
**,LT > w
** while w
*,LT may be above or below w
* .  The equilibrium is 
characterized by Proposition 2.   
 
PROPOSITION  2:  In  equilibrium  under  local  thinking,  for  any  given  level  of  investors’ 
wealth w: 
(a) The interest rate is weakly higher than under rational expectations, r
LT ≥ r.  
(b) Debt (and thus investment) is weakly higher than under rational expectations, D
LT ≥ D. 
(c) Securitization arises for lower levels of wealth w than under rational expectations, and 
for w sufficiently large is higher than under rational expectations,
LT
L S  ≥ SL.   
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To see the above results, note that the debt constraint under local thinking becomes 
r
LT
j D ≤ R∙
LT
H, j I   + πd∙A∙
LT
L, j S .                                              (15) 
Under rational expectations, the corresponding expression was  rDj ≤ R∙IH,j + πr∙A∙SL,j. The 
shadow value of securitization is higher under local thinking: an extra securitized project 
expands leverage by πd∙A under local thinking but only by πr∙A under rational expectations.  
The insurance mechanism provided by securitization is believed to be very effective by local 
thinkers because in the worst-case scenario they consider a sizeable share (πd) of the pooled 
projects succeed.  This is not so under rational expectations, where only πr of the projects are 
expected to succeed for sure. 
  This property implies that local thinking tends to boost the amount of debt repayment 
that can be sustained by securitization, but it does not say whether this boost will trigger an 
upward adjustment in the interest rate r or in the amount of leverage D
LT and investment I
LT.  
Figure 3 graphically addresses this question for the case in which w
*,LT < w
*.
4 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
 
The bold and dashed lines plot the equilib rium interest rate under local thinking and 
rational expectations, respectively. The lines differ in the range  in which risky projects are 
undertaken, as local thinking intermediaries believe the return on these projects to be higher 
than under rational expectations.  This boosts the interest rate to  r =
LT E (πω)∙A and tightens 
debt constraints, forcing intermediaries to securitize starting at lower wealth levels and more 
extensively (indeed, R/
LT E (πω)∙A
 < R/Eω(πω)∙A).  As long as w ≤ w
**, intermediaries absorb all  
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of investors’ wealth under both rational expectations and local thinking, so investment is the 
same in two cases (i.e., IL=
LT
L I = w + wint – 1).  In this range, the greater pace of securitization 
prevailing under local thinking just reflects a rat race among intermediaries that results in a 
higher interest rate, not in higher investment.  As we will see, this implies that over some 
range, securitization creates fragility without an ex-ante benefit of greater investment. 
  In the range w ≥ w
**, local thinking fosters not only securitization, but also leverage 
and investment beyond the level prevailing under rational expectations.  As investors’ wealth 
becomes  very  high,  the  interest  rate  must  fall  in  order  for  intermediaries  to  absorb  that 
wealth, but relatively less so under local thinking.  Until wealth reaches w
**,LT
 , the shadow 
value of securitization under local thinking allows intermediaries to absorb more wealth from 
investors and to pay them a higher interest rate than under rational expectations.  For w > 
w
**,LT, the interest rate under local thinking reaches its minimum of one and no more investor 
wealth can be absorbed. Now the only difference with rational expectations is reflected in the 
amount of leverage, which is higher under local thinking.   
  In sum, at t = 0 local thinking boosts the use of securitization relative to rational 
expectations, resulting in a higher interest rate only (for w ≤ w
**), in higher borrowing and a 
higher interest rate (for w
** < w < w
**,LT), or in higher borrowing only (for w ≥ w
**,LT). Similar 
effects are at play when w
*,LT > w
*.  We now consider the implications of this feature for the 
reaction of markets to news at t = 1.  
 
B.  Securitization and Fragility at t = 1 under Local Thinking  
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Consider the investment and securitization profile (
LT
H, j I , 
LT
L, j I ,
LT
L, j S ).  If the state is 
growth  or  downturn,  idiosyncratic  shocks  affect  the  profit  of  specific  intermediaries,  but 
riskless projects and securitized assets provide intermediaries with enough resources to repay 
their debt a t = 2.  When the realized ω is in the support of the states considered by the local 
thinker, the outcome is qualitatively similar to that arising under rational expectations. 
Matters change drastically in a recession.  Now intermediaries realize that at t = 2 they 
may not have enough resources to repay their debt, thereby precipitating a default.  To see 
how this possibility arises, consider the debt constraint of equation (15).  Since by Lemma 1 
securitization  is  used  when  this  constraint  is  binding,  in  any  equilibrium  with  positive 
securitization the intermediary at t = 0 commits to repay at t = 2 the amount 
r
LTD
LT = R∙
LT
H, j I   + πd∙A∙
LT
L, j S .                                             (16)    
Consider now the ability of different intermediaries to repay this debt.  The measure 
(1– πr) of unsuccessful intermediaries learns that their t = 2 operating profits are equal to  
R∙
LT
H, j I  + πr∙A∙
LT
L, j S + 0∙(
LT
L, j I – 
LT
L, j S ).                                      (17) 
By subtracting equation (16) from (17), we see that unsuccessful intermediaries default at t = 
2 because their operating profits are below the face value of debt by the amount (πd – πr)∙A∙
LT
L, j S >  0.    The  neglect  of  the  risk  of  a  recession  plays  a  key  role  here:  even  though 
intermediaries try to keep their debt safe by insuring against idiosyncratic risk, the fact that 
the securitized pool performs worse than expected by (πd – πr) reveals that debt is risky and 
triggers a default.  This problem arises because the local thinker neglects the possibility that 
an adverse idiosyncratic shock, against which the intermediary is insured, occurs precisely in 
a recession state when many other intermediaries are experiencing the same shock.   
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The measure πr of successful intermediaries learns that their t = 2 profits are equal to  
R∙
LT
H, j I  + πr∙A∙
LT
L, j S + A∙(
LT
L, j I – 
LT
L, j S ).                                        (18) 
By subtracting equation (16) from (18), we see that successful intermediaries may or may not 
be able to repay their debt.  In particular, equation (18) is higher than (16) and thus successful 
intermediaries are solvent if and only if  
  LT
L,
LT
L,
j
j
S
I
 > 1 + (πd – πr).                                                 (19)   
This is a key equation.  It says that for successful intermediaries not to default, the fraction of 
risky investment that is nonsecuritized must be sufficiently high relative to the cash flow 
shortfall resulting from their neglect of aggregate downside risk.  If securitization is close 
enough to zero, condition (19) is satisfied and successful intermediaries repay their debt.  In 
this case, after the unexpected recession occurs, a share 1– πr of intermediaries defaults but a 
(potentially high) share πr of intermediaries does not.  If instead securitization is close to full 
(
LT
L,
LT
L, j j I S  ), even successful intermediaries default.  In this case, all intermediaries default! 
When securitization is full, with probability φg intermediaries get a true bonanza payoff, but 
when their luck turns sour, with probability φr they get a fouled carry trade and financial 
distress.  Interestingly,  equation  (19)  reveals  that  financial  fragility  results  from  the 
combination  of  the  neglect  of  risks  and  high  investor  wealth  through  the  volume  of 
securitization 
LT
L, j S .  Even if the neglect of risk is small, formally, πd  πr, the financial system 
can collapse when investor wealth is so large that securitization is massive.   
Somewhat paradoxically, the more intermediaries insure against idiosyncratic risk, the 
more they become exposed to unexpected and adverse aggregate shocks.  The problem is that  
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securitization does not only dampen the fluctuations in intermediaries’ balance sheets, but 
also allows them to take on more leverage.  It is precisely this boost in leverage financing 
carry trades that renders intermediaries fragile.  The combination of insurance and leverage is 
problematic  because  it  creates  a  large  correlation  among  intermediaries’  response  to 
neglected risks, de facto transforming riskless debt claims into catastrophe bonds, as noted by 
Coval,  Jurek, and  Stafford  (2009b).    This  last  point  can  be  readily  seen  in  the  previous 
formalism: when condition (19) is not met, conditional on the realization of the unexpected 
state, a nonsecuritized (risky) debt claim defaults with probability 1– πr, whereas an allegedly 
safe fully securitized debt claim defaults with probability one! 
By endogenizing leverage and securitization, our model allows us to determine when 
condition (19) is met and when it is not. 
 
COROLLARY 1: If Eω(πω)∙A > 1, then there is a threshold w(R/
LT E (πω)∙A, w
*,LT) such that 
when a recession occurs, for w ≤ R/
LT E (πω)∙A no intermediary defaults, for w  (R/
LT E
(πω)∙A, w) only 1– πr intermediaries default, and for w > w all intermediaries default.  
 
This result highlights the role of investors’ wealth, via the interest rate, in shaping 
financial fragility.  When investors’ wealth is low, borrowing is limited.  Intermediaries’ 
wealth  wint  is  thus  sufficient  to  sustain  riskless  borrowing,  providing  an  effective  buffer 
against unexpected shocks.  As investors’ wealth rises, intermediaries’ wealth becomes too 
small to buffer against shocks.  To sustain further borrowing, intermediaries must  reduce 
balance  sheet  risk  via  securitization.    When  securitization  is  moderate,  the  unsuccessful 
intermediaries become vulnerable to unexpected aggregate shocks but the successful ones are  
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still able to repay from the income generated by their own projects.  When investors’ wealth 
becomes very high and the interest rate very low, intermediaries boost leverage by maxing 
out securitization.  Now all intermediaries are equally unprepared to withstand the aggregate 
shock.  Here securitization spreads unexpected aggregate shocks across all intermediaries, 
leading all of them to default.  Systematic risk becomes systemic. 
The analysis links several aspects of the financial crisis that were previously noted but 
not seen as related.  We have already highlighted that, even under rational expectations, our 
model  explains  the  role  of  the  world  savings  glut  in  driving  securitization,  the  cyclical 
comovement of bank assets and leverage, procyclical risk-taking by banks, increasing bank 
interdependence,  and  the  concentration  of  aggregate  risks  on  bank  balance  sheets  in 
securitization.  In our model, a high level of investor wealth leads to expanded securitization, 
growing  leverage,  growing  assets  of  the  intermediary  sector,  lower  interest  rates,  and 
increased bank risk taking.  Under the neglected risk assumption, the model yields additional 
implications.  Most importantly, it shows that the system that is highly stable under rational 
expectations  becomes  extremely  fragile  and  sensitive  to  tail  risks  because  securitization 
entails  increasing  bank  interdependence.    It  also  delivers  the  important  prediction  that 
securities perceived to be completely safe (AAA-rated) and used by banks as collateral to 
raise safe outside debt suffer losses when tail risks are realized.  Bank losses in a crisis come 
precisely  from  these  AAA-rated  securities  created  by  tranching  diversified  portfolios  of 
projects (Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009)).   In Section IV, we show how an extension of the 
model also explains liquidity dry-ups in a crisis.   
The source of fragility is the neglect of aggregate risk.  Unlike in the case of rational 
expectations, where securitization allows an appropriate increase in leverage and investment,  
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when market participants are local thinkers, securitization sustains excessive insurance and 
thus excessive leverage, which renders the economy very sensitive to unexpected adverse 
aggregate shocks.  In the current model, excess securitization benefits intermediaries (who 
are able to exploit more profitable carry trades), but hurts investors by inducing them to over-
lend and by exposing them to unexpected aggregate shocks.  Since risk-averse investors are 
inefficient bearers of this risk, excess securitization leads to a net social loss. 
In an alternative, but closely related, interpretation of the model, securitization works 
through the creation of a standardized liquid market in whatever assets investors perceive to 
be  safe  (e.g.,  AAA-rated  MBS).    Intermediaries  borrow  against  these  “safe”  assets  and 
probably even tilt their carry trades toward these assets because they are easier to lever up.  
The net result is that any investor misperception of risks results in massive investment in and 
borrowing against this “safe” asset class, creating a situation in which all intermediaries are 
vulnerable to the same sectoral risk.  The high correlation of defaults across intermediaries in 
the bad state results from loading up on exposure to this neglected risk.  In our model it is 
diversification (and tradability, see Section IV) that creates the false perception of absolute 
safety and the high correlation of defaults, but the mechanism is potentially more general.   
In the current model, agents learn about the neglected risk at t = 1 but fragility and 
losses are realized at t = 2, when defaults occur.  In reality, in contrast, when bad news hits 
we  often  observe  asset  trading,  price  drops, and  spikes  in  risk  premia.  The  next  section 
presents a modification of our basic setup where all of these features naturally emerge.  Many 
other theories account for liquidity dry ups and spikes in risk premia, but our goal here is to 
show that securitization importantly contributes to their occurrence.
5 
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IV. Securitization and Leverage with Slow Arrival of Information 
We modify two assumptions from the previous setup.  First, we assume that a fraction 
of risky projects pays off its return A at t = 1 rather than at t = 2.  At t = 0, it is not known 
which projects pay out early.  A project not repaying early need not be unsuccessful, since 
some successful projects pay out late (e.g., restructured mortgages).  The second departure 
from the previous setup is that the fraction of early-paying projects is partially informative 
about ω, perhaps because it acts as a signal of aggregate output.  
Formally, we assume that at t = 1 either state h or l is realized.  In state h, a share qh of 
intermediaries  obtains  A  on  their  risky  projects  at  t  =  1,  while  the  remaining  1  –  qh 
intermediaries must wait until t = 2 for their return to realize.  In state l, a share ql < qh of 
intermediaries receive A on their risky projects while the remaining 1 – ql must wait until t = 
2 for their return to realize.  As a result, Ω1{l,h} and Ω2{g,d,r}.  The share of projects 
paying out “early” is informative about the aggregate state: the probability that any “late” 
project is successful at t = 2 is higher in state h than in state l.  We formalize this notion by 
assuming  that  the  unfolding  of  events  is  captured  by  the  following  event  tree  (which  is 
chosen to nest the distribution of final states previously considered): 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
   
In Figure 4, the nodes at t = 1 report the share of successful intermediaries at t = 1, 
while the nodes at t = 2 report the total share of successful intermediaries (at t = 1 and t = 2).  
The numbers in the branches capture the probabilities of moving up or down at a given node.  
The aggregate state that we previously called “growth” here consists of a streak of good  
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news, a “downturn” consists of a mix of good and bad news, and a “recession” is a streak of 
bad news.  As of t = 1, state h is good news, but it remains uncertain whether the overall state 
is πg or πd, while state l is bad news but it remains uncertain whether the overall state is πd  or 
πr. 
Besides  their  informational  content,  the  key  implication  of  the  presence  of  early 
projects is that intermediaries may use the portion of early returns that was not pledged to 
creditors to buy back some debt claims in secondary markets at t = 1.  This second effect 
becomes critical in shaping changes in market liquidity when at t = 1 investors realize the 
presence of neglected risks. 
At a more technical level, the presence of “early” projects also implies that some debt 
repayment must occur at t = 1 when the early projects in securitized holdings yield qω∙A∙
LT
L, j S  
(recall that there is no storage).  This arrangement can be described as a long-term fully safe 
debt contract promising one coupon at t = 1 and another at t = 2.
6   We stress that, consistent 
with our prior assumption, debt continues to be fully riskless (within the states of the world 
that come to mind).  To simplify the analysis, but with no consequence for our key results, we 
also assume a two-tiered seniority structure within riskless debt.  The most senior riskless 
debt is pledged up to the safe return 
LT
j H RI ,  and gets repaid at  t = 2, while the less senior 
riskless debt is pledged the lowest return on the pool of securitized assets 
LT
j L dS ,  .  This 
second class of riskless debt gets part of its repayment at t =1 and part at t = 2.  The only role 
of this  assumption is  to simplify the working of secondary markets  at  t  = 1, effectively 
turning them into markets where securitized pools are re-traded. 
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A.  Securitization, Liquidity and Financial Fragility  
To  study  the  model,  we  focus  on  the  case  of  local  thinking.  Consistent  with  the 
previous analysis, we model local thinking by assuming that at t = 0 agents only think about 
the two most likely paths in the tree.  Under the assumption φd > φr/(φg+φr), which we impose 
throughout, the most likely paths are growth and downturn, so that at t = 0 local thinkers 
prune the lower branch of the tree, considering only the upper one:   
 
[Figure 5 here] 
 
Upon  observing  the  neglected  state  ql  at  t  =  1,  the  only  possible  paths  lead  to  a 
downturn or a recession.  Market participants realize that they are in the lower branch of the 
tree, and take the previously neglected risk of a recession into account. 
Consider the optimal policy of intermediaries at t = 0.  Given the event tree in Figure 
5, the investment-financing policies of intermediaries are isomorphic to those described in 
Section III.A under local thinking and full revelation of information.  First, since investors 
are indifferent between consuming at different dates, at t = 0 they do not care about the 
timing of returns and lend the same amount they lent when they fully learned ω at t = 1 and 
consumed only at t = 2.  The only technical difference is that now Figure 5 implies that the 
local thinker’s expected return is equal to Eω(πω|t = 0)∙A =    A d d g r g         ) ( , which 
differs from the average return expected by the local thinker in the static setup of Section II.     
Second, at any investment-securitization profile (
LT
H, j I ,
LT
L, j I ,
LT
L, j S ), the supply of riskless 
bonds by intermediaries at t = 0 is unaffected by either of our new assumptions: the presence  
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of “early” projects  or partial learning.  The maximum amount of riskless  cash flow that 
intermediaries  can  pledge  is  equal  to  the  safe  return  R∙
LT
H, j I   plus  the  early  return  from 
securitization qh∙A∙
LT
L, j S , plus the “late” return from securitization (πd – qh)A∙
LT
L, j S  valued at the 
worst state investors are thinking about.  The riskless debt constraint faced by intermediaries 
at t = 0 is thus given by      
rDj ≤ R∙
LT
H, j I   + πd∙A∙
LT
L, j S ,                                              (20) 
which is identical to equation (15) prevailing under full information revelation.  Once again, 
the form of the debt constraint (20) is due to the fact that we focus on riskless debt.  Section 
IV.B, however, shows that under the assumption of slow information arrival, intermediaries 
may boost debt capacity by issuing risky debt. 
  Although early projects and slow information arrival do not change the results of 
Proposition 2 concerning the t = 0 equilibrium prevailing under local thinking, this is not so 
outside of normal times, in the unexpected aggregate state ql at t = 1.  Now matters become 
very different.  If at t = 1 market participants observe an unexpectedly low share ql of “early” 
projects, they realize that they are in the lower branch of the tree in Figure 4, which they had 
previously neglected.  
As in the local thinking analysis of Section III.B, investors now suddenly realize that 
what  can  be  pledged  in  the  worst  state  of  nature  by  each  intermediary  from  its  own 
securitized holdings 
LT
L, j S  drops by the amount (πd – πr)A∙
LT
L, j S .
7  Most important, since at t = 1 
there is residual uncertainty as to whether the final state is recession or downturn, there is 
residual risk in the claim held by investors.  Since investors are not efficient bearers of this 
risk,  there  is  a  rationale  for  them  to  sell  their  (now  risky)  debt  claim  to  risk-neutral  
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intermediaries.  This is particularly problematic for “late” intermediaries whose risky project 
has not paid at t = 1, as the debt they issued against securitized pools now faces a severe risk 
of default (the fact that only securitized debt claims are subject to default risk is due to our 
simplifying assumption of a two-tiered debt seniority structure). 
To  see  this,  consider  the  securitized  assets  of  a  generic  late  intermediary.  Upon 
observing ql, the investors that had been pledged up to πd∙A∙
LT
L, j S  by the intermediary from 
these assets effectively become owners of the cash flow generated by these assets and value it 
at the worst-case value πr∙A∙
LT
L, j S .
8  On the demand side, an early intermediary having some 
spare liquidity at t = 1 has a higher reservation price E(πω|ω = l)∙A∙
LT
L, j S  (> πr∙A∙
LT
L, j S ) for the 
cash flow generated by the securitized assets of a late intermediary.  To reiterate, there are 
gains for risk-averse investors to sell their risky debt claims on late intermediaries to the risk-
neutral early intermediaries having some spare liquidity at t = 1, and for these intermediaries 
to purchase this debt.  Notwithstanding these gains, the key question is what volume of trade 
can be sustained at t =1 by the wealth of the ql early intermediaries confronted with the 
supply of the securitized (now risky) debt of the remaining (1 – ql) late intermediaries. 
To determine the equilibrium, denote by V1 the total market value of this now risky 
debt at t = 1.  Even if V1 is below their valuation, early intermediaries are only able to buy 
debt to the extent that they have enough resources available.  At t = 1, the total resources 
available to early intermediaries to buy debt claims in secondary markets are equal to  
ql∙[A∙(
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S ) – (πd – πr)A∙
LT
L, j S ],                                         (21) 
which consists of the payoff from “early” projects that were not securitized (and thus not 
pledged to creditors) minus the unexpected drop in the lowest value of the securitized assets  
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pledged to creditors, which must be repaid using nonpledged resources.  Since riskless debt is 
senior to equity, the intermediary must pledge part of the return from early projects to its 
creditors, because the pool of risky projects cannot alone ensure that debt is repaid in full.   
Using (21) we can prove the following result: 
 
PROPOSITION 3: If the share of early projects is ql, the equilibrium at t =1 is as follows: 
(a) If  LT
L
LT
L
S
I
> 1 +  ) ( E
) 1 (
) (
LT l
q
q
l
l
r d 

        , then early intermediaries have a lot of 
spare wealth at t = 1 and thus absorb all of the now risky debt, bidding up its market value to 
their reservation value V1 = (1– ql)∙E(πω|ω=l)∙A∙
LT
L, j S . 
(b) If  LT
L
LT
L
S
I
[ 1 +  d
l
l
r d q
q
  
) 1 (
) (

  , 1 +  ) ( E
) 1 (
) (
LT l
q
q
l
l
r d 

        ], then early 
intermediaries have a medium amount of spare wealth at  t = 1.  They still absorb all of the 
now risky debt but now the market value of debt is  V1 = ql∙[A∙(
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S ) – (πd – πr)A∙
LT
L, j S ], 
which is lower than intermediaries’ reservation price. 
c) If  LT
L
LT
L
S
I
<  1 +  d
l
l
r d q
q
  
) 1 (
) (

  , then early intermediaries have little spare wealth at t 
= 1. Now they cannot absorb all of the now risky debt, whose equilibrium price stays at 
investors’ reservation value V1 = (1– ql)∙πr∙A∙
LT
L, j S . 
In cases (a)-(c) the ratio 
LT
L
LT
L /S I  and the difference 
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S   fall with investors’ wealth w.  
 
Proposition 3 shows that securitization creates financial fragility not only by exposing 
unsuccessful intermediaries to unexpected aggregate shocks as we saw in Section III.B, but  
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also by draining out market liquidity after the unexpected shock has occurred.  When a large 
share of investment is securitized (i.e., 
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S  is low), even intermediaries with “early” 
projects are illiquid when the unexpected shock occurs, because they had sold part of their 
successful projects to other intermediaries and they increased their leverage.  This implies 
that  even  if  the  unsecuritized  part  of  the  portfolio  is  sufficiently  large  to  allow  “early” 
intermediaries  to  repay  their  own  creditors,  these  intermediaries  are  unable  to  provide 
liquidity backstop to other creditors by purchasing the distressed debt claims of the “late” 
intermediaries.  Once more, initial investor wealth is critical in creating financial fragility, for 
it is precisely when investors’ wealth is high that securitization and leverage are extensive, 
causing secondary debt markets to be fragile.
9 
In Shleifer and Vishny (2010) and GSV (2012), market liquidity is scarce because the 
investment gains reaped by intermediaries induce them to commit all of their wealth at t = 0.  
In our model, in contrast, the insurance mechanism provided by securitization boosts fragility 
not  only  by  inducing  intermediaries  to  commit  their  wealth  ex-ante,  but  also  and  most 
distinctively by rendering the “spare wealth” conditions of different intermediaries highly 
correlated.  In fact, the model in GSV can be viewed as a special case of this model in the 
range where securitization is full so that idiosyncratic risk is fully removed. 
The  case  with  partial  securitization  highlights  the  distinctive  mechanism  through 
which  insurance  creates  fragility.    In  that  case,  it  is  still  true  that  some  unsuccessful 
intermediaries experience financial distress because, as in Shleifer-Vishny (2010) and GSV 
(2012),  they  have  committed  all  of  their  wealth  to  investment.    However,  successful 
intermediaries  with  unencumbered  balance  sheets  are  able  to  provide  liquidity  support.   
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These  intermediaries  have  also  committed  all  of  their  wealth  ex-ante,  but  limited 
securitization leaves them with some spare capacity to rescue the unsuccessful intermediaries 
thanks to the bonanza of early successful projects.  Markets are liquid in the sense of Shleifer 
and Vishny (1992, 1997), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009).    With  more  extensive  securitization,  however,  the  spare  capacity  of  successful 
intermediaries does not suffice to provide backstop insurance to the unsuccessful ones. By 
creating a correlation in the performance of different intermediaries through an endogenously 
created network of relationships, securitization creates market illiquidity.  This correlation 
can  be  viewed  as  a  source  of  counterparty  risk  created  by  the  interlinkages  typical  of 
insurance arrangements, generating systemic risk in the sense of Giglio (2010).   
   
B. Risky Debt and Risk Premia 
The previous analysis shows how trading and liquidity of riskless debt is shaped by 
securitization  after  the  realization  of  neglected  risks,  but  does  not  meaningfully  explain 
changes in risk premia since risk-averse investors do not hold risky securities. In our model, 
securitization and its link to financial fragility also have implications for risk premia. 
To  begin,  note  that  the  presence  of  “early”  projects  may  allow  intermediaries  to 
expand debt capacity by issuing risky debt to investors.  So far we have only considered the 
issuance of riskless debt claims pledging the lowest support of the risky pool πd∙A∙
LT
L, j S  (on 
top  of  the  riskless  return 
LT
H, j RI ).    However,  the  intermediary  could  issue  a  (risky)  debt 
security that pledges the entire cash flow from the pool, or equivalently it pledges the risky 
pool  as collateral, effectively using securitization not  only as pooling but  also as a ring- 
 
37 
fencing device.  Crucially, investors are willing to lend up to p1∙
LT
L, j S  for this security, where 
p1 is the market value of risky collateralized debt at t = 1 in the event tree of Figure 5 that 
agents are thinking about.  If investors expect to resell the pool at t = 1 at a price p1 > πd∙A, 
pledging the entire pool as collateral allows intermediaries to increase the shadow value of 
securitization in terms of relaxing the riskless debt constraint (5), which becomes rDj ≤ R∙
LT
H, j I  + p1∙
LT
L, j S .  Debt capacity is indeed larger than in (20) precisely when p1 > πd∙A.  If 
instead investors expect a market price for risky collateral of p1 = πd∙A, then posting risky 
collateral entails no expansion in debt capacity relative to purely riskless debt. 
The possibility of market trading explains why it might indeed be the case that in 
equilibrium p1 > πd∙A: intermediaries holding “early” projects are willing to pay more than 
πd∙A for each unit of the pool because – being risk-neutral – they also value the pool’s upside.  
Once again, the question is whether early intermediaries are sufficiently wealthy at t = 1 to 
sustain a high market price p1 > πd∙A.  In the remainder of this section, we sketch the analysis 
of an equilibrium where p1 > πd∙A. The goal of our analysis here is not to fully characterize 
the equilibrium set, but to identify circumstances in which the very mechanism permitting the 
issuance of risky debt at t = 0 to investors – the expectation of ex-post market liquidity – 
evaporates when neglected risks materialize, creating fragility. 
Consider  an  equilibrium  in  which  the  price  at  t  =  1  is  equal  to  intermediaries’ 
reservation value, namely, p1 = Eω(πω|ω=l)∙A.  To see under what condition this equilibrium 
is sustainable, note that along the expected path of events at t = 1 there is no default on debt, 
so  that  the  liquid  resources  of  intermediaries  are  equal  to  qhA∙(
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S ).    That  is, 
intermediaries’ resources are equal to the nonsecuritized (and thus nonpledged) return of the  
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early projects in h.  On the other hand, early intermediaries must absorb the market value of 
the totality of risky debt at their reservation price, which amounts to Eω(πω|ω=l)A
LT
L, j S .  The 
liquid resources of intermediaries are enough to absorb this amount when 
LT
L
LT
L
S
I
> 1 + 
h q
h) ( E
LT     .                                            (22) 
When this equilibrium is sustained, that is, (22) holds, intermediaries’ debt capacity is R∙
LT
H, j I
+ Eω(πω|ω=h)∙A∙
LT
L, j S .  For any value of 
LT
L, j S , this is above their debt capacity with riskless 
debt in equation (20).  Note that higher debt capacity does not boost aggregate borrowing 
because  the aggregate  resources  available  to  intermediaries  at t =1 are fixed.  The main 
feature of this arrangement is that the same amount of borrowing can be carried out using less 
securitization.  Due to the presence of a liquid secondary market, each unit of securitization is 
more valuable to investors. 
Since the left-hand side 
LT
L,
LT
L, / j j S I  of equation (22) falls with investors’ wealth w, from 
subcase (c) in Proposition 1 it follows that there exists a threshold  w ~  such that equation (22) 
holds for w(R/ Eω(πω|ω=h)∙A,  w ~). Intuitively, for a secondary market to operate at t = 1, 
investors’  wealth  must  be  sufficiently  large  [w  >  R/Eω(πω|ω=h)∙A]  that  some  assets  are 
securitized.  On the other hand, if investor wealth is too large, securitization is so extensive 
that early intermediaries are illiquid even in good times, making it impossible for them to buy 
all risky claims at their reservation price.  Hence, we must have w <w ~ .    
  In terms of the t = 0 equilibrium, note that when w(R/Eω(πω)∙A,w ~ ) securitization is 
partial, otherwise (22) would not hold, and thus r = Eω(πω|ω=h)A, just as in subcase (c) of 
Proposition  1.    In  this  equilibrium,  at  t  =  0  risk-averse  investors  buy  risky  debt  at  the  
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equilibrium interest rate valuing the underlying risky collateral at  Eω(πω|ω=h)A, which is 
precisely the intermediaries’ reservation price.  In this precise sense, at t = 0 the risk premium 
on risky debt is equal to zero.  Intuitively, even if investors dislike risk, they value collateral 
at its risk-neutral value because they believe that tomorrow they can sell their debt in a liquid 
market dominated by risk-neutral investors.
10     
Once more, however, this arrangement is very sensitive to neglected risk.  When at t = 
1 market participants observe a low share of “early” projects ql, they immediately realize that, 
in the most optimistic scenario, they are only able to sell at the average price Eω(πω|ω=l)A, 
which is less than what they expected to obtain at t = 0.  The unexpected bad state reduces 
intermediaries’ valuation at t = 1, exposing investors to resale risk.  Most important, however, 
even if intermediaries’ valuation does not change much, in the sense that Eω(πω|ω=l) ≈ Eω(πω| 
ω=h), investors are also exposed to the possibility that a bad realization of a neglected risk 
may cause liquidity at t =1 to evaporate.  This effect can be so strong as to drive the price of 
risky debt at t = 1 down to investors’ ex-post valuation, which has become equal to πr∙A.  In 
this case, the risk premium jumps from zero at t = 0 to [Eω(πω|ω=l) – πr]A at t = 1. 
We now identify the conditions leading to this case, which illustrates in the starkest 
manner the mechanism for fragility under risky debt.  This case arises when qlA∙(
LT
L, j I –
LT
L, j S ), 
the liquid resources of intermediaries at t = 1, are insufficient to absorb all risky debt at 
investors’ reservation price.  This occurs provided 
LT
L
LT
L
S
I
< 1 + 
l
r
q

,                                                        (23) 
which holds when the nonsecuritized portion of the investment by successful intermediaries 
is sufficiently small.   Conditions (22) and (23) are mutually consistent provided  
 
40 
) ( E h
r
h
l
q q
q
  

 .                                                   (24) 
When (24) holds, there is a range of investor wealth levels for which intermediaries expand 
debt capacity by selling risky debt to investors.  This debt is sold without a risk premium at t 
= 0, but its risk premium becomes very large when neglected risks materialize. 
Here the novel aspect causing both the boom and bust in the value of debt and the 
fluctuation in risk premia is securitization itself.  In good times, securitization reduces risk 
premia by creating a relatively safe and liquid form of collateral.  After all, the investor thinks 
if the intermediary is hit by an adverse idiosyncratic shock, he can always sell its debt in the 
market and reduce his downside risk.  This effect sustains ex-ante leverage.  In bad times, 
however, securitization creates a strong correlation in the returns of intermediaries, which 
renders secondary markets illiquid after bad aggregate news.  This drives risk premia up as 
neglected risks materialize.  The problem here is that the local thinking investor neglects the 
possibility that the intermediary whose debt he owns goes under precisely when many other 
debtors go under as well.  In these neglected states, the very securitization that had created 
the illusion of safety causes liquidity to collapse.  As a consequence, the risk- averse investor 
is stuck with risky debt, which causes the risk premium to rise.  
 
V.  Discussion 
In this section, we compare three theories of shadow banking and securitization, and 
consider their implications for the financial crisis. All three theories see securitization as 
meeting the demand for safe debt by pooling and tranching cash flows so as to reduce the risk 
of securities thus manufactured.  Early research on securitization focused on how this process  
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can overcome adverse selection problems (see Gorton and Pennachi (1990), De Marzo and 
Duffie (1999), De Marzo (2005), and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstrom (2009)).  According to 
this  “textbook”  view,  the  essential  feature  of  safe  securities  is  that  all  investors  are 
symmetrically  informed  (or  ignorant)  about  their  payoffs,  and  therefore  can  trade  them 
without fear of being ripped off.  The informational symmetry among investors creates a 
liquid market for safe debt.  In principle, this liquid market allows banks to sell off loans and 
reduce the riskiness of their balance sheets.  Prior to the crisis, however, banks probably 
retained too much risk.    
The second theory, which we refer to as the “regulatory arbitrage” view,  seeks to 
explain this puzzle of risk retention by stressing the role of distortionary financial regulation 
in encouraging securitization without risk transfer.  Some of the key papers include Calomiris 
and  Mason  (2003),  Acharya  and  Richardson  (2009),  and  Acharya,  Schnabl,  and  Suarez 
(2012).    According  to  this  view,  banks  pursued  securitization  through  off-balance-sheet 
Special Investment Vehicles (SIVs) to get around capital requirements, and obtained bond 
ratings to go further with this activity (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010), 
Benmelech and Duglosz (2009), Stanton and Wallace (2010)).  By transforming part of the 
assets held on their balance sheets into highly rated securities, banks were able to sustain 
higher  leverage  and  still  comply  with  risk-weighted  capital  requirements.  The  regulatory 
arbitrage view is often combined with the separate idea of “too big to fail,” which holds that 
banks were willing to provide liquidity guarantees to SIVs and otherwise retain risks because 
they counted on a government bailout if things went badly (Acharya and Richardson (2009)).  
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The  third  view,  which  we  develop  in  this  paper,  also  sees  securitization  as  a 
mechanism of risk reallocation between risk-averse investors and risk-neutral intermediaries, 
but stresses the role of expectations in shaping its magnitude and efficiency.  
All three views deliver some of the main facts about the shadow banking system.  
First,  all  three  theories  start  with  substantial  demand  for  safe  debt,  due  to  regulatory, 
liquidity,  or  risk-aversion  reasons.    Second,  they  all  see  securitization  as  a  financial 
innovation that meets this demand by pooling and tranching cash flows.  Third, all three 
theories explain why banks retain some risk.  Under the adverse selection view, banks retain 
risks because the securities they sell must be safe enough to avoid triggering investment in 
information.   Under the regulatory arbitrage view, banks retain tail risks because they count 
on a bailout.  In our model, banks are the efficient bearers of risk, and retain it efficiently 
(under rational expectations).  
All three views also suggest how a bad shock precipitates a financial crisis.  Under the 
adverse selection view, a piece of bad news raises the probability of default on safe debt 
enough to trigger investment in information by market participants. As soon as they begin 
such investing, market participants realize that they could be less informed than their trading 
counterparties and become reluctant to trade.  Liquidity evaporates and markets crash.   Even 
relatively minor news, when it precipitates a quest for information, can unravel markets.   
Under  the  regulatory  arbitrage  view,  a  piece  of  bad  news  about  cash  flows,  the 
government’s commitment to bank rescues, or both can destabilize a highly leveraged bank.  
There could be a run on the bank, or a refusal of the lenders – the buyers of the short-term 
securities the bank issues – to roll over debt.  When several banks experience this shock, or 
when banks are interdependent, the financial system can collapse.  It is precisely because  
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banks are able to evade capital requirements and lever up so much that they are so vulnerable 
to shocks. 
In  our  theory  (with  neglected  risk),  “safe”  debt  is  over-issued  against  securitized 
pools.  When these pools are recognized to be riskier than initially believed, intermediaries 
experience  losses  and  risk-averse  lenders  become  exposed  to  default  risk,  precipitating 
fragility and illiquidity.  
The three theories are not mutually exclusive, and all are likely to have played a role 
in the 2007 to 2009 crisis.  The regulatory arbitrage view in particular explains some features 
that our model cannot, such as the dominance in securitization of the ultra-large banks, which 
were most likely to count on a bailout (Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2011)).  This view is also 
consistent with evidence that some institutions, such as money market funds, took on more 
risks in 2007 even after these risks became apparent (Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2011)).
11  The 
on-going European banking crisis seems to be caused by regulatory arbitrage, not neglect o f 
risk.    
Our paper does not address other aspects of securitization.  We do not model  ring-
fencing of  collateral in securitization, which makes it   available to creditors outside of 
bankruptcy proceedings, another feature  increasing the safety of debt (Gorton and Souleles 
(2006), Gorton and Metrick (2012)).  Nor do we model the maturity transformation and runs 
by  short-term  creditors  as  triggers  of  the  crisis ,  elements  stressed  by  Shin  (2009 ), 
Brunnermeier (2009), and Gorton and Metrick (2010, 2012).   In our view, the financial crisis 
had a lot to do with a massive and unanticipated shock to the assets of the financial 
intermediaries, and specifically assets used as collateral for short -term debt  (Copeland, 
Martin,  and  Walker   (2010),  Krishnamurthy,  Nagel,  and  Orlov   (2011)).  We  see  the  
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withdrawal of short-term finance as largely a response to that shock and not a wholly separate 
cause of the crisis.    
Despite these limitations, we believe that our theory is needed to explain aspects of 
the 2007 to 2009 crisis, largely because of the failure of markets to anticipate it.  Under the 
pure  regulatory  arbitrage  view,  banks  and  other  market  participants  were  aware  of  the 
increased risks being taken prior to the crisis, but were counting on a bailout.  However, if 
ratings  were  inflated  through  questionable  financial  engineering  of  MBS  and  CDOs,  the 
spreads on such securities should still have reflected the increased risk of default, but there is 
evidence that they did not (Ashcraft, Goldsmith-Pinkham, and Vickery (2010),  Coval, Jurek, 
and Stafford (2009a,  2009b), Jarrow et  al. (2007)).   Adelino (2009) finds  that  yields  on 
different AAA-rated MBS were not predictive of subsequent performance, in contrast to the 
yields of lower rated securities.   
One can argue of course that, ex ante, the probability that these securities would do 
poorly was incredibly small, so expectations were in fact rational.  What we saw was a rare 
disaster or a perfect storm (Barro (2006), Gabaix (2012)).  On this, we note two points.  First, 
we do not claim that all tail risks are always neglected.  In fact, many catastrophic events 
such as sovereign defaults often loom large in investors’ minds, and our theory does not 
describe such risks.  But, second, to say that some rare disasters are contemplated by markets 
is not to say that all of them are.  We have laid out direct evidence that, in the crisis of 2007 
to 2009, critical risks were underestimated.  As Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a, 2009b) 
show, as late as 2007 the prices of bonds reflect small risk premia, not large risks of default.  
Direct evidence on credit ratings, on models used by rating agencies, on forecasts of housing 
prices, and on internal communications inside financial institutions all point to a failure to  
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adequately consider the possibility of a disaster.  While these issues remain controversial, we 
believe there is a need to take neglected risks seriously as part of the narrative of the financial 
crisis.  
Our view of the shadow banking system has several empirical implications that may 
help to distinguish it from the other theories discussed here.  First, our view sees financial 
crises as manmade disasters that therefore occur more frequently than might be expected in a 
neoclassical  framework,  where  market  participants  minimize  the  risks  of  default  and 
bankruptcy.  Our model also has the implication that a post-mortem analysis of market data 
shows that market participants were not fully aware of the risks being taken.  Second, when 
key decision makers do not appreciate the risks they take, looking at management incentives 
cannot predict very well which institutions get into trouble.  It is difficult to argue that top 
executives at Lehman and Bear Stearns had incentives to take big risks because they faced 
little  downside.    Third,  greater  securitization  in  our  model  is  associated  with  a  greater 
likelihood of financial fragility.  Witness the speed with which the crisis unfolded in the U.S. 
and the U.K. versus in the rest of Europe.  Finally, because investors may extrapolate past 
returns and become wrongly convinced of the safety of certain assets, future crises are more 
likely to be associated with assets that have shown little downside risk in the recent past. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
  We present a new model of shadow banking that describes securitization without any 
risk transfer outside the core banks.  Securitization allows banks to diversify idiosyncratic 
risk while concentrating their exposure to systematic risk.  This process enables them to 
expand their balance sheets by essentially funding carry trades with riskless debt.  When all  
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risks are recognized ex ante, this market efficiently allocates them to risk-neutral financial 
intermediaries, and expands opportunities for insurance and intertemporal trade.  This view of 
securitization under rational expectations accounts for many empirical phenomena, including 
the role of the demand for safe debt in driving securitization, the comovement of bank assets 
and leverage, and the rising interdependence of banks as a byproduct of securitization.  This 
view also suggests that the shadow banking system becomes extremely fragile when tail risks 
are neglected.  The trouble is not the realization of neglected risks per se, but the increase in 
the  total  amount  of  risk-taking  that  securitization  facilitates.    Securitization  magnifies 
exposure  to  unrecognized  aggregate  risks  through  contracts  between  intermediaries  that, 
absent neglect, would improve welfare.      
  One might ask how this mechanism differs from the more basic proposition that banks 
often finance risky projects, such as mortgages, and occasionally face huge losses when such 
financing turns sour.  What is new about securitization is that it enables intermediaries to 
access  enormous  pools  of  short-term  capital  seeking  riskless  returns  even  without 
government  deposit  guarantees.  By  identifying  activities  in  which  investors  misperceive 
risks, perhaps because they pay too much attention to recent history, financial intermediaries 
can use securitization to finance a lot more risk than they could without it.  The cost, of 
course, is that they bear the residual risk themselves.  It is precisely the process of risk control 
through diversification and securitization that exposes all intermediaries to common risks, 
and generates aggregate instability in excess of what would occur if each bank speculated on 
its own.  Moreover, because the availability of short-term finance is based on the perceived 
safety of publicly traded securities held by many banks, bank runs quickly turn system-wide.  
Insurance contracts intended to be risk-reducing end up enhancing systemic risk.    
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  The risks neglected by market participants tend to be subtle and constantly evolving.   
For  this  reason,  it  is  optimistic  to  expect  market  regulators  to  identify  these  risks  when 
investors and even intermediaries fail to do so.  Still, some policy interventions might make 
the system  more stable.  The most obvious, if crude, instrument  is capital  requirements, 
which can successfully reduce the ability of intermediaries to expand their risky activities 
even when risks are neglected.  Our model suggests that it is better to control overall bank 
leverage, to the extent possible, than to  rely on risk-weighted capital requirements, since 
ratings are vulnerable to the neglect of risks.  The failure of rating agencies during the crisis 
eloquently testifies to this effect.  Alternatively, regulators might raise a red flag when they 
see increasing exposure of intermediaries to a particular sector, such as real estate, especially 
when accompanied by securitization and collateralized borrowing.  Regulators might also be 
wary of financial innovations such as prime money market funds whose appeal consists of 
offering higher returns with allegedly no risk.  Knowledge of which risks are neglected is not 
essential for recognizing the signs of such neglect in the financial system.   
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Figure 1. Marginal return on investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Interest rate, wealth, and securitization. 
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Figure 3. The interest rate under local thinking.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Information tree. 
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Figure 5. The local thinker’s information tree. 
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1 The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article. 
2 In asset pricing terms, investors have a strong aversion to negative skewness in returns.  Harvey and Siddique 
(2000) provide evidence on conditional skewness preference and asset pricing.  
3 That is, activity L is a marginal and risky investment (e.g., subprime mortgages) th at intermediaries wish to 
undertake only after better investment opportunities (e.g., p rime mortgages) are exhausted. We can think of 
banks as having their own broadly diversified but limited portfolios yielding the return R, as in Diamond (1984), 
which they can use to support safe debt without securitization. But once the potential of that portfolio to support 
safe  debt  is  exhausted,  banks  need  to  find  a  way  to  use  risky  projects  to  support  riskless  debt.    
What matters for our results is not that the risky investment yields a lower average return than the safe one, but  
that the safe investment is in limited supply. This assumption ensures that after all safe returns are pledged to 
creditors, additional financing can only be raised via securitization.    
4 When w
*,LT < w
*, securitization is higher under local thinking,  LT
L S  ≥ SL for all w.  When w
*,LT > w
*,
  there 
might be an intermediate wealth range in which securitization is higher under rational expectations. Precisely 
because under rational expectations the shadow value of securitization is lower, intermediaries may need to use 
more of it to absorb investors’ wealth.  
5 Our model is related to Geanakoplos (2009) in his emphasis on the pessimists financing the asset purchases of 
optimists with safe debt. Our approach differs from his in its focus on departures from rational expectations as 
opposed to differences in beliefs and in its focus on the welfare impact of securitization.  
6 The same effects can be obtained by having short-term debt roll over at t = 1.  We stick to long-term debt for 
consistency with our previous analysis.  An alternative is to have all projects pay out at t = 2 but to have some 
revealed to be successful at t = 1.  In this case, intermediaries revealed to be successful at t = 1 could issue safe 
debt at this date to purchase claims in secondary markets. This alternative formulation would  yield similar 
results to the current one, but requires a more cumbersome characterization of the market equilibrium at t = 1.    
7 This reduction in investors’ own valuation of debt is due to an unanticipated drop in t = 1 repayment of (qh – 
ql)A
LT
L, j S  plus a drop in t = 2  repayment of (πd  – πr – qh + ql)A
LT
L, j S .  
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8 For simplicity we assume that trading occurs before the t = 1 debt repayment is made, so that the value of the 
debt includes the coupon ql A∙
LT
L, j S . 
9 Rather than re-trading risky debt in secondary debt markets, a better risk allocatio n at t = 1 could be achieved 
by additional financial innovation (tranching) at t = 1 whereby investors carve out the risky portion of debt 
repayment and sell it to intermediaries while keeping the safe portion for themselves.   
10 Although this mechanism works though the trading of long-term debt, the same intuition can be developed in 
the context of riskless debt in terms of the expectation of debt rollover at t = 1. Another possibility to implement 
the same equilibrium is for investors rather than intermediaries to buy the securitized pools at the outset.  
11 The role of CEO incentives in risk-taking by banks (Rajan (2006)) remains controversial.  Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2011) and Erel, Nadauld, and Stulz (2011) do not find that bank CEOs with significant equ ity stakes 
acted more conservatively before the crisis than  others.  Calomiris and Mason (2003) find some evidence 
consistent with regulatory arbitrage in a study of credit card securitization, but also find that banks set their 
capital as a function of market perceptions of risk rather than maximizing the implicit subsidy from a bailout.  